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Introduction: 
 
Why do candidate countries for EU membership transform themselves? How do they achieve 
this? How far can the transformation be attributed to the EU as opposed to other factors? 
These are questions that have engendered a growing body of literature addressing especially 
the transformation of Central and East European countries (CEECs) that joined the EU in 
2004. The literature makes extensive use of the concept of “Europeanization” generally 
defined as the adoption and implementation of EU rules and regulations. Conditionality is a 
concept that is placed very much at the center of the “Europeanization” of CEECs. The idea 
that membership, the ultimate goal/reward, is made conditional to the adoption and 
implementation of EU rules lies behind conditionality. The EU closely monitors candidate 
countries progress in respect to the adoption of its rules. This highly institutional and 
structured process of monitoring lends considerable visibility to conditionality and hence 
engulfs it with explanatory powers. Yet, what exactly lies behind the magic of conditionality 
is rarely studied in depth? How do candidate countries, their public policy makers, respond to 
conditionality? Why do some candidate countries adopt EU rules faster than others or why do 
they do it in respect to certain issues and not others? These questions are often left 
unanswered. 
 
Writing in 2002, Grabbe offers a detailed analysis of the relationship between conditionality 
and the transformation of accession countries during the last round of enlargement.
1 She 
demonstrates the “levers” that the EU fields to ensure conditionality and highlights the 
“unequal” nature of the relationship emphasizing how ultimately accession would occur only 
when member states are actually ready for it. The focus is more on the supply side of 
conditionality and the problems associated with the manner conditionality is applied by the 
EU. These problems lead her to suggest that actual accession could take a long time and that 
in the case of Bulgaria and Romania negotiations could take as long as 10-15 years.
2 Yet, the 
transformation process worked much faster than expected as even latter two countries were 
able to join the EU by January 2007. This seems to highlight the need to look also at how 
conditionality is received by accession countries and what drives its reception and speedy 
implementation.  
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Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier address the issue of the actual impact of conditionality on the 
decision makers of candidate countries.
3 They discuss three models. Their preference is for 
the “external incentive model” in which “size and speed of rewards”, “credibility of 
conditionality” accompanied with the “size of governmental adoption costs” are the most 
critical independent variables in explaining the dependent variable: “rule adoption”.
4 In other 
words the behavior of the candidate country will be a function of the interplay between these 
three factors. Schimmelfening et al especially in the context of political conditionality do also 
highlight that the “credibility of threats and rewards is a core prerequisite of any effective 
bargaining process” even if this can not on its own explain the success of conditionality.
5 
They emphasize that conditionality will not work without credibility. The size of government 
adoption costs is also offered as a critical factor shaping rule adoption. It is possible that in 
spite of high credibility rule adoption may still not occur or be slow. In other words public 
policy makers of a candidate country may well calculate a governmental adoption cost matrix 
that may slow the adoption of EU rules in spite of a highly credible reward in the form of EU 
membership if the condition is indeed met.  
 
It is also possible to envisage a situation where doubts about the ultimate reward 
(membership) may bring a limit to the credibility of conditionality and in turn influence cost-
benefit matrix of those policy makers who are responsible for calculating governmental 
adoption costs. The aim of this paper is to explore the limits of conditionality from the 
perspective of decision makers who have to calculate the “size of the governmental adoption 
costs” in the face uncertainty over ultimate membership of their country. Current studies of 
Europeanization of candidate countries have been based implicitly or explicitly on the 
premises that these countries would one way or the other ultimately become members. In 
many ways the membership perspective of CEECs was never in question. The “European” 
credentials of these countries were never questioned. More often then not the accession of 
CEECs was framed in a discourse emphasizing their return into the European family of 
countries. Furthermore, the past record of the EU had been such that an accession process 
once it started was always completed with membership unless candidate countries themselves 
chose not to join the EU. Public policy makers when calculating the size of the adoption costs 
pretty much factored into their calculation that eventual membership was not in question. The 
worse that they could expect could be a delay or the threat of delay in accession. The case of 
Bulgaria and Romania clearly demonstrates this.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of “uncertainty over ultimate membership” 
on Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier model of conditionality as a factor that explains 
Europeanization. It is with this in mind that this paper will examine the “limits of 
conditionality” with a particular emphasis on Turkish accession. Turkey constitutes a unique 
case. The prospect of Turkish membership has generated a debate in which a vocal group of 
actors in Europe resists eventual membership. This in turn is impacting on Turkish public 
policy makers cost-benefit analysis. At a time when academic interest in Turkish accession in 
general and Turkey’s “Europeanization” is increasing an effort to achieve a better 
understanding of the limits of conditionality is called for. The paper is divided into three 
sections.  
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The first part offers a brief analysis of Turkey’s “Europeanization” under the influence of the 
EU’s political conditionality for starting accession negotiations. This was a period during 
which it is possible to argue that Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier “external incentive model” 
actually helps one to understand and explain the drastic transformation that Turkish domestic 
politics and foreign policy went through. The second section on the other hand focuses on 
how the model becomes inadequate to explain the manner in which policy makers in Turkey 
began to resist certain critical reforms once accession negotiations started. The paper looks in 
particular at the issue of asylum as a very specific area in which Turkey has to adopt EU rules 
and implement them. This section will offer a brief analysis of the evolution of the Turkish 
asylum system and show how Turkish decision makers have reached a point where they are 
ready to adopt EU rules and requirements but stop short of doing so. The final section 
attempts to demonstrate how in a very specific policy area the erosion of the EU’s credibility 
in respect to Turkey’s ultimate membership is actually weakening the capacity of 
“conditionality” to induce “rule adoption”. The paper will conclude that the uncertainty over 
eventual EU membership and mistrust is keeping public policy makers’ calculation of 
“governmental adoption costs” prohibitively high while at the same time the Turkish asylum 
system is itself going through a kind of “Europeanization”
 6.  
 
 
Transformation of Turkey: 
 
Less than ten years ago it would have been difficult to imagine that Turkey would be starting 
its accession talks with the European Union. Buzan and Diez in an extensively cited article 
had noted that the very nature of politics in Turkey precluded any real prospects of the EU 
engaging Turkey for membership.
7 At the time Turkey was well short on “democracy”, well 
short on “economic and political stability” and it was an abundant source of considerable 
tension in the region. Turkey had a reputation for being a country with a readiness to resort to 
“hard power” in its relations with many of its neighbors and hence referred to in some circles 
as a “regional coercive power” or a security “consumer” rather than a security “provider or 
exporter”.
8 Its economy was characterized by high levels of inflation, interest rates and 
unpredictability. There were severe restrictions on basic freedoms such as freedom of 
expression and association. The country was embroiled in a violent conflict with the PKK and 
the then anti-terror laws fell well short of European standards. Worse Turkey had a very poor 
human rights record that adversely affected asylum seekers and refugees. Capital punishment 
though not in use was still in the books. This was also a period when Turkish foreign policy 
making was dominated by the security establishment and the ministry of foreign affairs. The 
world outlook of these decision makers at the time was very much formed by a narrow 
national security considerations and deep mistrust towards the external world. There was a 
general feeling that the external world very much wanted to destabilize, weaken and divide up 
                                                 
6 “Europeanization” in this particular context is used in broader sense of the word than just “rule adoption” or 
EU-ization but a recognition on the part of the policy makers that the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
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Turkey. Furthermore, civil society and the business world had little influence on policy 
making in general. 
 
Today we are confronted with a different Turkey. The effort to meet the Copenhagen political 
criteria has changed Turkish politics deeply even if there remains a lot that still needs to be 
achieved. Diez and many others have studied this transformation in the area of both domestic 
politics as well as foreign policy in some detail.
9 In contrast to ten years ago the death penalty 
has been abolished for good, considerable ground has been covered in respect to improving 
minority rights. The freedom of expression and association rights has been significantly 
expanded. The state security courts have been closed down. The influence of the military on 
the political system has been reduced especially by redesigning the structure of the National 
Security Council. What is however much more significant is that in Turkey “hearts and 
minds” are being transformed. Turkish officials are learning to cooperate and work with civil 
society. The influence of business and economic considerations are growing over classic 
“national security” considerations. Most fascinatingly the notion of “win-win” thinking in 
Turkey’s relations with the external world is replacing the old “zero-sum” approach to 
international relations.
10 In this respect the military is learning to adjust itself to the new 
realities. Furthermore, and may be most importantly, the EU’s engagement of Turkey is seen 
increasingly by the military as a development that is contributing to Turkish security rather 
than eroding it.
11  
 
Against this background an area where the transformation of Turkish foreign policy became 
most conspicuous is reflected in the dramatic and major turn about when the government 
adopted a completely novel policy on Cyprus. In the 1990s Turkey’s approach to the problem 
of Cyprus was centered a round the idea that “no solution is the solution”. Turkey had been 
party to 40 years of fruitless negotiations and had basically supported the status quo on the 
island created as a result of the events in the summer of 1974. Instead Turkey decided to lend 
its support for the Turkish-Cypriots’ decision to go along with the Annan Plan contemplating 
the reunification of the island. This plan was originally announced by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in November 2002.
12 This uniquely detailed and comprehensive plan envisaged 
the establishment of a reunited Cyprus, delicately striking a balance between the two sides on 
the island. The Plan went through a number of modifications before it took the form that was 
submitted to a referendum on both sides of the island in April 2004. The government’s ability 
against considerable resistance to ensure support for the Annan Plan brought about no less 
than a paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy. This played a critical role in the Turkish-
Cypriots support for the Annan Plan during the referendum without which it would have been 
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pretty much impossible for Turkey to see the European Council take the decision to start 
negotiations. 
 
Such a paradigmatic shift is also visible in respect to relations between officials and civil 
society. The notion of cooperating with the external world was relatively alien to the Turkish 
military and bureaucracy. The ‘Sévres phobia’ together with the accompanying deep mistrust 
towards the West and the international community often constituted a major mental barrier for 
Turkish officials in developing cooperative projects with foreign officials. This too began to 
change as closer relations with the EU made it inevitable that officials had to develop contacts 
at all levels with their EU counterparts and with civil society as well as international 
organizations. Turkish officials from the Ministry of the Interior, Gendarmerie and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs have cooperated very closely with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and Turkish and international non-
governmental organizations.
13 For example, the Interior Ministry officials subsequently 
joined by the Gendarmerie were able to make arrangements in September 2003 with a non-
governmental organization, Human Resources Development Foundation (Insan Kaynaklarını 
Geliştirme Vakfı- HRDF) and the Directorate General of the Status of Woman to provide 
social assistance to victims of trafficking until their return to their countries of origin could be 
arranged.  
 
The Turkish economy looks very different too. In comparison to the mid-1990s the Turkish 
economy has grown significantly in size and has continued to become diversified. The size of 
the Turkish economy in 1995 when the customs union was signed, stood at 166,5 billion 
USD. By 2005 it had more than doubled in size and grown to 353 billion USD. Most of that 
growth has actually taken place since EU membership prospects became more serious. No 
economy of the “old Europe” has come any where near such a level of growth. Actually, IMF 
reported that the Turkish economy had become the 19
th largest economy in the world having 
surpassed Sweden and Switzerland over the last two years. The IMF also predicted that if 
Turkey remains on its path it is expected that in 2007 the size of the Turkish economy will 
reach 447 billion USD overtaking the Belgian economy.
14 Turkish foreign trade has grown 
significantly from 57.3 billion USD in 1995 close to 190 billion USD in 2005 and over 220 
billion USD in 2006. Most dramatically Turkey’s infamous hyper-inflation has been brought 
under control and in 2005 was below 8 per cent compared to 106 per cent in 1995. Similarly, 
the budget deficit has been shrinking and there are already reports that Turkey could be 
meeting the Maastricht criteria much earlier than previously expected.
15 Confidence in the 
Turkish economy and society has been reflected in a conspicuous manner in two specific 
areas. Tourism has significantly increased and become a major source of income especially 
for financing Turkey’s current account deficit. Most fascinatingly visitors to Turkey went up 
to more than 20 millions in 2005 from just under 8 millions in 1995 suggesting a striking 
growth in Turkey’s attraction to visitors. A significant proportion in the increase came 
actually from countries neighboring Turkey partly due to Turkey’s growing attractiveness 
partly due to Turkey’s liberal visa policy. Foreign direct investment was another growth area. 
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In 2005 FDI entries was close to 10 billion USD more than the total of all FDI that had 
previously entered the country until 1999.
16  
 
Undoubtedly, the EU has played a very central role in this transformation. It is not at all 
surprising that the above changes started subsequent to the Helsinki European Council 
summit’s decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country. The condition in the form of 
having to meet the Copenhagen political criteria was central to the series of reforms that were 
adopted. Furthermore, the Helsinki summit conclusions had also made it clear that Greek-
Turkish relations had to improve as well as progress be achieved on the question of Cyprus. 
As pointed out by Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier “external incentive model” suggests that 
the credibility of conditionality was critical to fueling Turkey’s transformation. This 
credibility and the ability of leading EU players, ranging from Gunter Verheugen as the 
commissioner responsible for enlargement to Romano Prodi as the president of the European 
Commission to many other EU officials and politicians, to convince Turkish public policy 
makers that if the “conditions” are met accession talks would indeed start deeply marked the 
process of cost calculation in respect to “rule adoption”. The credibility of the EU’s sanctions 
and rewards also deeply marked the Turkish public opinion, parts of the civil society and the 
“market”. This generated additional pressure on the government. On a number of occasions 
this pressure was critical to break the resistance to the adoption of certain reforms especially 
in respect to the lifting of the death penalty, broadcasting and education in minority 
languages, decriminalizing adultery etc… Similar remarks could be made on a number of 
foreign policy issues ranging from Cyprus to the decision not to be involved in the American 
intervention in Iraq. 
 
Limits of conditionality and deadlock in rule adoption: 
 
Since then a massive reversal has taken place in EU-Turkish relations. Support for EU 
membership has taken an unprecedented and drastic fall.
17 The government too seemed to 
loose its will and drive in support of reforms. The Kurdish problem flared up again in Turkey 
as the PKK increased its attacks on military and civilian targets. Many in Turkey started to 
blame these developments on the EU as well as the United States.
18 A number of 
developments that are difficult to reconcile with the Copenhagen political criteria have 
occurred including the indictment and conviction of journalists and intellectuals for simply 
expressing their opinions on various issues. Little progress occurred in accession negotiation 
that formally started in October 2005. The general expectation was that the European 
Commission would be adopting a very critical progress report in October. There were also 
many who were actually talking about the possibility of a “train-crash” scenario leading to the 
                                                 
16 The total stock of FDI in Turkey in 1999 was just over 10 billions USD. See section entitled “Foreign Direct 
Investment” p. 2 at http://www.deik.org/bultenler/businessguide/DEIK-BG-8-FDI.pdf (visited 29 April 2006). 
17 In April 2006 a public opinion survey announced that 63.1% of the Turkish public still support membership 
and 58% considers membership useful, but that 50.3% believes that the EU aims to divide Turkey (‘Türkiye 
Milliyetçilik Araştırması’, Tempo, No. 957, 6 April 2006, pp. 26–27). More recent surveys show much lower 
levels of support for EU membership compared to 74–75% in 2002 and 2003. In October 2006 a public opinion 
survey reported that only 32.2% of those surveyed believed ‘Turkey must join the European Union’, while 
78.1% said they did not trust the EU (Milliyet, 24 Oct. 2006). For an analysis of the rise of nationalism and Euro-
skepticism in Turkey see Ioannis Grigoriadis, Upsurge amidst Political Uncertainty: Nationalism in post-2004 
Turkey (Berlin: SWS Research Paper, October 2006). 
18 It is not surprising that in April 2006 after the wide spread disturbances in Diyarbakir and elsewhere in 
Kurdish populated southeastern Turkey the media was filled with analysis blaming these disturbances to the EU 
and the United States intentions to undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity as the cause of the disturbances.  See 
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suspension of accession talks or even the “loss of Turkey”.
19 The “train-crash” scenario at the 
end did not occur and instead the European Council in December decided to suspend 
accession negotiations in eight chapters while promised that the rest of the accession process 
would advance as planned at least until 2009. Since then in March negotiations on one chapter 
was opened and three more are expected to be opened during the German presidency. The 
government also adopted a document in April 2007 that sets out in some detail the work and 
the timeline for completing Turkey’s harmonization process by 2013.
20 Yet, fascinatingly this 
document, in the section dealing with “justice, freedom and security, does not include any 
specific information on the harmonization work that needs to be done in respect to especially 
the lifting of the “geographical limitation” to the Geneva Convention. Similarly, no 
information is provided for in respect to the demands of the European Commission to 
negotiate and sign a readmission agreement. These two topics are among a handful of issues 
that have been deemed as too sensitive and left out of the document. 
 
In spite of a limited improvement in EU-Turkish relations the general mood is one that is 
difficult to reconcile with a country that is actually in the pre-accession stage where “rule 
adoption” is critical. What has happened to Turkish public policy makers especially dealing 
with asylum and immigration issues? Has their cost-benefit calculus been altered? What has 
changed? Why is “conditionality” not working? There are of course a multitude of reasons 
that can be cited. However, here emphasis will be put on developments that have drastically 
undermined the EU’s credibility in Turkey. In other words one of the critical elements of the 
Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier “external incentive model” has been undermined. The model 
expects candidate country behavior to be partly determined by the “size and speed of 
rewards” that the EU is able to offer. The ultimate reward being membership the Turkish 
public and public policy makers have come to doubt that the EU is capable or for that matter 
willing to deliver this reward even if “conditions” are met. In other words the EU, possibly 
first time in the history of enlargement appears to be losing its credibility, severely limiting 
the traditional role of “conditionality” in ensuring “Europeanization”. 
 
There are a number of reasons for this loss of trust in EU’s credibility. Foremost is the nature 
and content characterizing the discourse on Turkish membership in a number of EU member 
countries. It is widely know that a good proportion of the European public opinion is against 
Turkish membership. Surveys that are regularly run by Euro-stat and a number of other 
agencies saw this resistance. However, this resistance have been accompanied by a language 
adopted by politicians in countries such Austria, France, Holland and Denmark that many 
Turks have found not only discouraging but also offensive.
21 This discourse became 
particularly visible during the summer of 2005 in the run up to the Council decision opening 
accession talks in October and in June 2006 when the first chapter was opened and closed. 
The constant emphasis on “cultural difference” and that a “privileged partnership” instead of 
membership has reinforced the general belief that the EU is a “Christian Club” and will not 
admit Turkey whatever Turkey does.  
 
                                                 
19 Kirsty Hughes, Turkey and the EU Four Scenarios: From Train Crash to Full Steam Ahead (Chatham House, 
London, 2006) and Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, ‘Turkey on the Brink’, Washington Quarterly, summer 
2006. 
20  Türkiye’nin AB Müktesebatı’na Uyum Programı (2007-2013) available from: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/indextr.html. 
21 Gordon and Taşpınar,  2006, p. 57, the authors have highlighted how the public in Turkey has been feeling 
frustrated with the European discourse on Turkey and attributed some of the rise in nationalism in Turkey to this 
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Turkish public is deeply convinced that the EU is not handling Turkish accession in a manner 
similar to the previous round of enlargement and other current candidate countries. This 
mistrust was also reflected in the manner in which the “Accession Negotiation Framework” 
was dissected by the Turkish media for evidence of wording suggesting double standards 
towards Turkey and reluctance on the part of the EU to eventually admit Turkey as a 
member.
22 Hence, it is no wonder that emphasis was put on the document’s reference to the 
“negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed 
beforehand” rather than to “the shared objectives of the negotiations is accession”.  
 
The Framework also introduced a new mechanism meant to strengthen the “credibility of 
conditionality” called bench-marking. This new practice calls for the Commission to ensure 
that a certain degree of “rule adoption” and actually implementation does indeed take place 
before chapters are actually opened for negotiations by the Council. This new practice has 
been perceived by especially public policy makers involved in the negotiation process as 
another development that throws the EU’s credibility into question in their eyes. The fact that 
this practice was suggested together with a renewed emphasis put on the EU’s “absorption 
capacity” further aggravated the credibility problem. The “absorption capacity” had actually 
always been part of the Copenhagen criteria but had never been invoked until the question of 
Turkish membership came up. This of course did not go unnoticed by the Turkish public and 
policy makers. 
 
One other important factor undermining the EU’s credibility has been the Cyprus problem. 
The EU played a central role in inducing a massive change in Turkey’s policy toward Cyprus. 
After the acceptance of the Annan Plan by the Turkish-Cypriots and its rejection by the 
Greek-Cypriots the EU, just before Cyprus’s accession, adopted decisions to alleviate the 
isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots community. The EU has had great difficulties in putting 
these decisions into action. In return the Turkish public has difficulties in comprehending why 
the side that said “yes” to the Annan Plan continues to be penalized while the other side 
became a member of the EU. This situation is extensively exploited by the opposition 
especially in the context of the EU mounting pressure to get Turkey to open its harbors and 
airports to Cypriots vessels. The fact that the government feels domestically weak and unable 
to meet these “conditions” related to Turkey’s custom union with the EU aggravates the 
domestic debate. The military became party to the debate too when the chief of staff publicly 
objected to a compromise deal entertained briefly by the government and the ministry of 
Foreign affairs. In this debate the EU is inevitably presented as the defector from the earlier 
deal leading the EU’s credibility to further weaken in the eyes of the public as well as policy 
makers. Hence, the debate during the Fall of 2006 about completely suspending accession 
talks with Turkey unless Turkey opens its harbors and airports to Cypriot vessels and then 
finally the decision to suspend talks on eight chapters did not help.  
 
This loss of trust towards the EU is severely undermining progress in EU-Turkish relations in 
general as well as in the process of opening the thirty-five odd chapters for negotiations. One 
area where the effects of the loss of trust in the EU and hence loss of the “credibility of 
conditionality” is in the chapter that deals with “justice, freedom and security in the EU”. 
Under this chapter among the acquis that Turkey is supposed to adopt is the current EU 
directives in the area of asylum. Like its predecessors, the most recent Accession Partnership 
(AP) document clearly lays out the tasks that Turkey has to fulfill to complete the “rule 
                                                 
22 This document can be accessed from 
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adoption” process.
23 AP also lays out a rough time table for this process. Immigration issue in 
general is a highly contested issue within the EU. This leads the EU side, especially through 
the European Commission, to attribute a lot of importance and urgency to asylum and 
combating illegal migration. Hence, Turkey is under tremendous pressure to put into place a 
fully fledged national status determination process and develop the legislation and the 
institutional capacity to process asylum seekers and grant local protection for recognized 
refugees. This is also central to the full implementation of the current EU directives on 
asylum without which the “first country of asylum” and “safe third country of asylum” 
principles embedded in the EU acquis could not be implemented for Turkey.  
 
As will be pointed out in the next section Turkey’s asylum regime went through considerable 
reform over the last decade. However, Turkey continues to share status determination with the 
UNHCR and expects recognized refugees to be resettled rather than be granted the possibility 
of local integration. Furthermore, occasional violation of the “non-refoulement” principle 
continues to be reported. Central to this policy is the “geographical limitation” with which 
Turkey accepted to implement the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.
24 This frees Turkey from the obligation of granting fully fledged refugee status to 
asylum seekers coming from outside Europe or more specifically to asylum seekers fleeing 
events outside Europe. The EU expects Turkey to lift this geographical limitation. Turkey has 
in its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis accepted to do it but made it 
conditional to the introduction of “legislative and infra-structural measures” and “the attitudes 
of the EU Member States on the issue of burden-sharing,”
25 As it will be examined in the 
following section, various measures that the Turkish government has adopted over the last 
couple of years has brought the Turkish system very close to introducing a fully fledged 
national status determination system. Yet, public policy makers have technically pushed the 
lifting of the geographical limitation to a period after 2012 and as mentioned earlier they have 
persuaded the government not to include any commitments in the recently adopted 
harmonization program covering the period from 2007 to 2013. Why? The next section of this 
paper will briefly describe the Turkish asylum system and evaluate recent reforms. The role of 
the UNHCR in these reforms will be highlighted while the paper will try to demonstrate how 
the EU’s “conditionality” tool is failing to convince Turkish officials to put into place a 
national status determination process compatible with the EU acquis and lift the geographical 
limitation. The paper will conclude that the uncertainty over eventual EU membership and 
mistrust is keeping public policy makers’ calculation of “governmental adoption costs” 
prohibitively high while at the same time the Turkish asylum system is itself going through a 
kind of “Europeanization”. How can this be accounted for? 
 
 
Turkish asylum system and challenges to its “Europeanization”: 
 
                                                 
23 Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession 
Partnership with Turkey, Official Journal of the EU, L 22/34, 26.1.2006. The document can be accessed at: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/dokumanlar/apd/Turkey_APD_2006.pdf 
24 For an analysis of Turkey’s asylum system before reform see Kemal Kirisci, "Is Turkey lifting the 
"geographical limitation"?: The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey," International Journal of 
Refugee Law  8:3, (1996). For an assessment of these reforms see Kirisci (2001) and K. Kirişci, “Turkish asylum 
policy and human rights: Adjusting to international norms and EU accession requirements” in Z. Kabasakal-Arat 
(ed.) Human Rights Policies and Prospects in Turkey (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
25 Secretariat General for the EU Affairs. Turkey: National Programme for the adoption of the Acquis. Section 
on “4.25.2 Asylum”. (Ankara, 2001).   10
In the West Turkey is traditionally known as a country of emigration. Yet, Turkey, like its 
predecessor the Ottoman Empire, has long been a country of immigration especially for 
Muslim ethnic groups, ranging from Bosnians to Pomaks and Tatars, as well as Turks from 
the Balkans and to a lesser extent from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Between 1923 and 
1997, more than 1.6 million immigrants came and settled in Turkey.
26 Furthermore, after the 
Nazi takeover in Germany and then during the Second World War there were many Jews who 
fled to Turkey and then resettled in Palestine. There were also many who fled the German 
occupied Balkans for Turkey and returned to their homelands after the war had ended. Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has also become a country receiving an increasing 
number of irregular workers and immigrants from Balkan countries and former Soviet 
republics as well as Iran, northern Iraq and Africa. These often include people that overstay 
their visa and work illegally. Turkey has also been a country of asylum, and is among the 
original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, Turkey is today among a very 
small number of countries that still maintains a "geographical limitation" to the agreement's 
applicability as defined in Article 1.B(1)(a) of the Convention. Accordingly, Turkey does not 
grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside Europe, and maintains a two-
tiered asylum policy. 
 
The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in Turkey's role as a 
Western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, in close 
cooperation with the UNHCR, Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries 
in Europe, including the Soviet Union. Such refugees, during their stay in Turkey, enjoyed all 
the rights provided for in the 1951 Convention. However, only a very small number were 
allowed to stay on in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals. Current 
Turkish legislation limits immigration and fully fledged refugee status with the integration 
option only to persons of “Turkish descent or culture”.
27 Hence, the overwhelming majority 
of the refugees were resettled out of Turkey. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate 
statistics on their numbers, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has indicated that some 13,500 
asylum seekers benefited from the protection of the 1951 Convention between 1970 and 1996. 
Statistics for previous years are not available. In addition, approximately 20,000 Bosnians 
were granted temporary asylum in Turkey during hostilities in the former Yugoslavia between 
1992-1995. Some of the refugees were housed in a refugee camp near the Bulgarian border, 
while many went on to stay with relatives in large cities such as Istanbul and Bursa. Since the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Plan in 1995, many of these refugees have been steadily 
returning to Bosnia. In addition, in 1998 and 1999, approximately 17,000 Kosovars came to 
Turkey to seek protection from the strife in their ancestral homeland. The majority have 
returned. There are also an undetermined number of Chechens who reside in Turkey in some 
what a legally grey zone.
 
The second tier of Turkey's asylum policy deals with persons from outside Europe. The new 
policy emerged in 1980 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, and subsequent instability in 
the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Upheaval in these areas led to a steady increase 
in the number of asylum seekers coming from outside Europe. For a long time, the 
government allowed the UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum 
seekers with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if the UNHCR 
recognized them as refugees, and that those whose claims were rejected would be deported. 
However, the growth in the number of illegal entries into Turkey and in the number of 
                                                 
26 For details see Kemal Kirişci, ‘Refugees of Turkish origin: ‘Coerced immigrants’ to Turkey since 1945’, 
International Migration, 34 (3)1996. 
27 For details see below p. 16 xxxx.    11
rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey strained this practice. The situation was also 
aggravated by the 1988 and 1991 mass influxes of Kurdish refugees amounting to almost half 
a million. Officials were also concerned that among these asylum seekers were militants of 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kürdistan – PKK) trying to enter Turkey from 
northern Iraq.  
 
It was against such a background that the government introduced a decree, the Asylum 
Regulation, in November 1994.
28 The Regulation aimed to bring status determination under 
the control of the Turkish government. It was primarily drafted with national security 
concerns and hence introduced strict regulations governing access to asylum procedures with 
little regard for the rights of asylum seekers and refugees.
29 It is not surprising that the 
practice that evolved in the first few years of the application of the Regulation attracted 
serious and concerted criticism from western governments, as well as major international 
human rights advocacy groups.
30 Critics argued that Turkey was undermining the rights of 
asylum seekers and refugees by denying them access to asylum procedures or failing to 
provide them adequate protection by violating the principle of non-refoulement. The 
Regulation had introduced the requirement that asylum applications be filed within maximum 
five days of entry into Turkey. The rule was often interpreted strictly and applications were 
refused on the grounds of being late. Such refusals were often followed by deportations. 
There were also cases of bona fide refugees recognized by the UNHCR being deported on the 
grounds that these persons had never actually filed applications and were in violation of the 
Regulation. This led to frequent conflicts between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR that 
continued to receive applications and assess them on their merits independently of the 
provisions of the Asylum Regulation. 
 
However, the situation began to improve by the late 1990s. Interestingly a good part of these 
improvements began to occur before the EU actually engaged Turkey as candidate country for 
membership and where encouraged by the UNHCR. There were a number of reforms. Most 
importantly, in 1997 the way to judicial appeal was opened when two local administrative 
courts ruled against the deportation orders of two Iranians refugees recognized by the 
UNHCR. These refugees had originally entered the country illegally and had not filed in their 
applications with the Turkish authorities in time. The MOI had ruled for their deportation 
under the provisions of the 1994 Asylum Regulation. The MOI’s appeal to a higher court 
against the decision of the lower courts was struck out too. This was also accompanied by an 
EHRC ruling (Jabari v Turkey)
31 against the deportation of an asylum seeker on the grounds 
of the provisions of the 1994 Regulation and that if this order was carried out this would 
constitute a violation of the EHRC. These judicial developments played a central role in 
getting the government to amend the Regulation in 1999 by initially extending the time limit 
to ten days.
32  
                                                 
28 Official Gazette, No. 22127, 30 November 1994. 
29 Kemal Kirisci, "Is Turkey lifting the "geographical limitation"?: The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum 
in Turkey," International Journal of Refugee Law  8:3, (1996) and Kirisci (2007) for an assessment of this 
Regulation.  
30 See for example the following reports U.S. Department of State: Turkey Country Report on Human Rights  for 
1996. (Released on January 1997 obtained from [www.state.gov] (28 Dec. 2000); Bill Frelick, Barriers to 
Protection: Turkey’s Asylum Regulations. (Washington D.C.: Report issued by the U.S. Committee for 
Refugees) and Turkey: Refoulment of non-European refugees – a protection crisis. (London: Amnesty 
International Secretariat, Document EUR 44/031/1997).   
31 European Human Rights Court (Fourth Section) Case of Jabari v. Turkey (Application no. 40035/98), 
Judgment, Strasbourg, (11 July 2000) 
32 Offcial Gazette, No. 23582, (13 January 1999).   12
 
Another indirect reform of the Turkish asylum policy came through the introduction of 
training seminars initially for MOI officials. The first of these took place in September 1998 
and involved officials that directly dealt with asylum seekers and refugees. These early 
seminars organized by the UNHCR were often the first of their kind. A steady stream of 
officials went through these seminars assisting the gradual accumulation of expertise 
accompanied with a process of socialization. This process significantly improved the 
officials’ understanding of the issues involved. They also contributed to a significant change 
in the attitudes of many of these officials towards asylum seekers and refugees. The training 
programs were gradually expanded to include other officials such as judges, prosecutors and 
gendarmes as well. Gendarmes are often the very first people that asylum seekers would 
encounter in border areas. Awareness programs to differentiate between illegal immigrants 
and asylum seekers were introduced to the training of the Gendarmerie. Programs were also 
held with the Bar Associations for prosecutors and judges focusing on refugee law. The police 
and gendarmes normally have to report immigrants or foreigners illegally present in Turkey to 
the local courts. Hence, prosecutors and judges play a critical role over whether such persons 
are deported or not. The seminars in these respects were critical in raising awareness of a 
body of law and practice to help distinguish between illegal immigrants and asylum seekers 
and Turkey’s legal obligations under international law.    
 
Another very important development was the growing cooperation between non-
governmental organizations and the government. An increasing number of non-governmental 
organizations ranging from the Turkish branch of Amnesty International to the International 
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) began to cooperate with the government in 
organizing and running some of the above training programs for officials but also seminars 
for lawyers and human rights activists. A growing number of non-governmental organizations 
began to take an interest in various ways of assisting asylum seekers and refugees.
33 Although 
this effort is at a limited scale, it constitutes an important beginning. Bar Associations in big 
cities such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, as well as some border towns, have developed 
various support programs geared to providing legal assistance for asylum seekers as well as 
training programs on asylum law and human rights of asylum seekers to their members. 
 
A striking aspect of these developments is that they are primarily a function of the good 
relations that the UNHCR succeeded in developing with the Turkish authorities. During the 
Cold War the UNHCR for all intend and purposes was doing status determination and 
resettlement for the Turkish government. The system became strained during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. It eventually collapsed in 1994 with the adoption and implementation of the 
Asylum Regulation. However, subsequently the efforts of the UNHCR and personal 
initiatives taken by some senior Turkish officials culminated in the reconstruction of 
cooperation between these two sides. The introduction of the training programs and the 
opening of the way to judicial review were concrete examples of this revitalized cooperation. 
These developments helped to build mutual confidence but also an understanding that both 
sides could actually benefit from the cooperation. The UNHCR ensured that it could fulfill its 
                                                 
33 On the 28-29 December 2004 the Ankara Branch Office of the UNHCR held the third of its annual 
consultation meetings with Turkish non-governmental organizations. There were more than 65 participants from 
these organizations as well as government agencies and universities. Subsequently, there have many other public 
occasions when government officials and representatives of non-governmental organizations met and discussed 
policy issues. A similar meeting had taken place in 2003 and was repeated in 2005 too. There were also 
numerous conferences and occasions organized by Boğaziçi University and Middle East Technical University 
that enabled government officials to debate, informally, policy options with representatives of  international as 
well as non-governmental organizations.   13
mandate obligations. In turn Turkey’s image in the international arena improved and even 
received the occasional praise.
34  
 
Yet, much more importantly and in a most fascinating manner the close cooperation between 
the UNHCR and the Turkish authorities culminated in a situation where the UNHCR would 
be  de facto doing the refugee status determination in Turkey on behalf of Turkey. Even 
though the Asylum Regulation identified the MOI as the body responsible for status 
determination, MOI officials came to rely increasingly on the judgment of the UNHCR. They 
were quite content to go along with UNHCR decisions as long as the asylum seekers were 
also registered with them and eventually those who were recognized as refugees do get 
resettled out of Turkey. The occasional differences were usually sorted out through informal 
consultations. Training seminars and close cooperation also enabled the UNHCR to gain 
access to groups of irregular migrants that get apprehended by the Turkish authorities, 
particularly in border regions of Turkey. As Appendix I suggests according to Turkish 
government statistics there were approximately 3,500 to 4,000 asylum applicants filed a year 
between 1995 and December 2006. During this period a total of almost 44,400 asylum 
applications were received and just under 22,300 of them were recognized as refugees. An 
overwhelming majority of the asylum seekers are from Iran and Iraq. The overwhelming 
majority of the recognized refugees were resettled out of Turkey as can be seen from 
Appendix II. More than 22,000 of these refugees were resettled to a range of countries led by 
Untied States and Canada but also a number of EU countries.
35  
 
This relationship constituted a massive learning and socialization experience for Turkish 
officials. One important manifestation of this experience was the manner in which the 
government amended the 1994 Asylum Regulation on two occasions. The first amendment as 
mentioned earlier had come in 1999 when the five day limitation for filing in an application 
was raised to ten days. This amendment brought about an improvement in reducing cases of 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement. The improvement was acknowledged by 
numerous human rights reports including the one prepared by the United States Department of 
State and Amnesty International. This date could indeed be considered as a turning point in 
the “Europeanization” of Turkish asylum policy. What is particularly significant is that it 
occurred well before there were any indications that Turkey would be recognized as a 
candidate country for EU membership at the end of that year. The second occasion occurred 
in January 2006 when the time limit was completely lifted and instead the reference to “within 
a reasonable period of time” was introduced.
36 This was a function of a process during which 
Turkish officials through the seminars, their interaction with UNHCR officials as well as 
representatives of non-governmental organizations and experts came to understand that one 
could not deny an asylum seeker access to status determination on the grounds of a violation 
of time limitations on application procedures. The principle that every application deserves an 
assessment on its merits gained recognition. 
 
                                                 
34 At a seminar on asylum law ran by Amnesty International in the city of Van near the Iranian border the AI 
representative noted that Turkey had recently progressed significantly in the implementation of international 
standards at a time when many EU member countries performance was sliiping backwards. See Denise Graf, 
“İşviçre Örneğinde Mülteci Hukuku Avrupa Uygulaması” presentation made at Mülteci Hukuku Eğitim 
Çalışması, organized by Amnesty International, 19-20 October 2002, Van. 
35 The figure of resettled refugees is larger than the figure for the period between 1995 and 2006 because they 
include refugees recognized from an earlier period too. 
36 Official Gazette, No. 26062, (27 January 2006).   14
It is extremely difficult to judge the impact of the EU in this process of transformation. It 
might be possible that the EU’s impact has been more formalistic while the UNHCR had 
more of an impact on the attitudes of Turkish officials as well as the actual substance of 
Turkey’s refugee policy. The two together however did assist a sort of a “paradigmatic shift” 
to occur among Turkish officials. This was a shift from a paradigm that framed the issue of 
asylum policy from a primarily “national security” perspective to one that increasingly 
emphasized human rights and international refugee law. The role of the EU has been more 
visible in respect to the setting of a formal agenda and a time table for eventual “rule 
adoption”. In this respect the consecutive Accession Partnership documents of 2001 and then 
2003 clearly induced Turkish officials to recognize that at some point the “lifting of the 
geographical limitation” would have to take place and that Turkey will have to adopt 
structural and institutional as well as legislative reforms. In 2002 the government formed a 
Task Force that brought together officials from very agencies possibly for the first time to 
actually discuss what needed to be done. This broadened the scope of the ongoing informal 
debate between officials directly dealing with asylum on the one hand and academics, experts 
as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations and the UNHCR on the other. 
The EU’s High Level Working Group on Turkey did also make funds and experts available 
for training seminars.
37 These seminars were critical in the words of a UNHCR official in 
helping to develop a “common language” between Turkish officials and their EU 
counterparts.
38 Furthermore, the adoption of the NAAP was also critical given its acceptance 
to lift the geographical limitation despite the conditions set. However, more important in this 
respect was the “twinning project” that the British and Danish governments supported. This 
project not only enabled Turkish officials possibly for the first time in their careers to work 
for months on a daily basis with their EU counterparts but the exercise also helped Turkish 
authorities to prepare the Action Plan on Asylum and Migration that was subsequently 
adopted by the government in March 2005.
39 This document in great detail identifies both 
national legislation and the EU acquis on asylum and migration. It also lays out in broad 
outlines the tasks and time table that Turkey intends to follow to prepare Turkey for the 
development of a fully fledged national status determination system, lift the geographical 
limitation and adopt EU directives on asylum and migration in general.  
 
The renewed Accession Partnership that was adopted in January 2006 subsequent to the 
beginning of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 sets medium period (the end of 
2009) as the deadline for the completion of the “rule adoption” exercise and the lifting of the 
geographical limitation. The document also expects Turkey, in the area of asylum, to make 
visible progress in setting up reception centers for asylum seekers, to develop a country of 
origin information system, to introduce national asylum legislation and to set up a specialized 
administrative unit to deal with asylum. In the meantime the screening process concerning the 
chapter that deals with asylum has been completed. The report of the Commission concerning 
the outcome of the screening process concerning the chapter on “justice, freedom and 
security” clearly highlight the gaps in the area of asylum and considers Turkey not to be 
compliant with the EU acquis.
40 The report has not yet been formally adopted and Turkey ahs 
not yet been asked to submit a “position paper”.  Turkish officials fear that the European 
                                                 
37 For a detailed analysis of the HLWG of the EU see Joanne van Selm “Immigration and Asyum or Foreign 
Policy: The EU’s Approach to Migrants and Their Countries of Origin” in Sandra Lavanex and Emek Uçarer 
(eds.) Migration and the Externalities of European Integration (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002).  
38 Exchange of email message with a UNHCR official in Ankara. 
39 The Action Plan on “Asylum and Migration” was officially adopted by the Turkish government on 25 March 
2005. The English and Turkish versions of the Plan can be reached from the following web pages: 
www.unhcr.org.tr, www.deltur.cec.eu.int, www.egm.gov.tr and www.abgs.gov.tr. 
40 The report can be accessed from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/screening_reports_en.htm   15
Commission will actually recommend that the EU demand certain bench marks for the 
negotiations to start. This could indeed provoke a “Catch-22” situation. There is the 
expectation that the Commission will seek clear signs that Turkey has indeed made concrete 
progress in respect to the establishment of an “asylum and migration authority”, reception 
centers and other requirements listed in the most recent AP before negotiation on this chapter 
could be opened not to mention the lifting of the “geographical limitation”. Furthermore, 
Turkish officials are already dismayed that the formal submission of the screening report is 
being delayed. They consider this delay as part and parcel of a larger exercise involving the 
slowing down of the negotiation process. Naturally, these developments further aggravate 
doubts about the EU’s credibility and deeply influence Turkish public policy makers cost 
calculation. 
 
Turkish decision makers are fully aware that previous candidate countries had to go through a 
similar “rule adoption” process. They are also aware that there were a number of countries 
that had to lift their geographical limitations such as Hungary, Latvia and Malta and that the 
first two countries did so well before their accession negotiations started.
41 They realize that 
they have to follow suit. However, they face a major dilemma provoked by their mistrust of 
the EU’s credibility in respect to the ultimate “reward” of membership. The greatest 
nightmare scenario for them is one in which they would find themselves lifting the 
‘geographical limitation’ without Turkey’s membership being taken seriously by the EU. 
Turkish officials are also conscious and deeply affected by the European public resistance to 
Turkish membership. They have also first hand knowledge of the experience of their 
counterparts in some of the new member countries against which they can compare their own 
dilemmas and “cost-benefit” calculation matrices. They are deeply aware that their 
counterparts when making critical decision they were pretty much confident that eventually 
membership would take place. A high level MOI official involved in asylum issues for almost 
a decade and an advocate of the reform of the Turkish asylum system put his deep concerns 
pretty bluntly.  This official during a visit to Hungary to learn about the Hungarian experience 
of lifting their geographical limitation and putting into place a fully fledged asylum system 
had actually asked his Hungarian counterpart how they were able to take on financially and 
politically very costly decisions. The Turkish official reflected on how “his heart sank” when 
his Hungarian counterpart simply said that this was never a major concern for them because 
they were always sure that they would become a member of the EU at the end.
42  
 
Another issue that marks the cost calculation of Turkish officials is burden sharing.
43 Owing 
to its geographical location, Turkish officials are conscious that Turkey risks becoming a 
buffer zone or a dumping ground for the EU’s unwanted asylum seekers and refugees. The 
adoption of the current acquis  would make Turkey a typical ‘first country of asylum’ 
                                                 
41These countries maintained their “geographical limitation” until 1998, 1997 and 2002 respectively. Turkey 
together with Monaco, Congo and Madagascar are the only remaining countries signatory to the Convention that 
continues to maintain a “geographical limitation”, Joanne van Selm, “European Refugee Policy: is there such a 
thing?” (New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 115, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, May 
2005) p. 4. 
42 The visit took place between 22-26 May 2006 as a part of a project supported by the British government and 
the International Catholic Migration Commission. 
43 The issue of burden sharing has been one of the difficult challenges that member states faced in developing a 
common asylum policy see Eiko Thielemann, “Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the 
European Union” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003), pp. 253-273 and Eiko Thielemann, 
“Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing?  Redistribution, Side-payments and the European Refugee 
Fund” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 807-824. This challenge has been greater in the 
case of candidate countries see Rosemary Byrne, “Harmonization and Burden Redistribution in the Two 
Europes” Journal of Refugee Studies Vol.16, No. 3, (2003), pp. 336-358.  16
responsible for status determination with membership and a “safe third country of first 
asylum” before then.
44 This raises considerable concerns among officials in terms of the 
economic, social as well as political implications. Turkish officials will expect to see burden-
sharing mechanisms that would go beyond what the current Refugee Fund can offer.
45 
Traditionally, refugees have been resettled out of Turkey. Turkish officials want to see an 
arrangement that would allow this practice to continue for some transitional period. However 
the current acquis does not allow for such a practice. This fear of becoming a buffer zone is 
also aggravated by Turkish officials perception of a growing EU tendency to externalize its 
asylum policies and its efforts to create a ‘fortress Europe’.
46 Ironically, these officials learn 
about the details of these policies from the very experts and representatives of non-
governmental organizations that they encounter during training seminars and conferences. In 
other words a Europe that tries to complicate if not deny access to asylum seekers to reach the 
EU is not setting a good example for Turkey in terms of harmonization and credibility.  
 
Turkish officials that would have to take the ultimate decision to suggest the lifting of the 
geographical limitation face an additional challenge that in many ways goes well beyond their 
power. One very important reason behind the current Turkish asylum policy that does not 
allow for the possibility of recognized refugees to be integrated has to do with Turkish state 
conception of national identity or “Turkishness”. The Turkish republic after its foundation in 
1923 adopted an immigration practice very much reminiscent of the German policy that 
allowed until recently the Aussiedler the possibility of facilitated immigration to Germany. 
The major piece of legislation governing immigration into Turkey is The Law on Settlement 
(No. 2510) of 1934. In a most conspicuous manner the Law limits the right to immigrate to 
Turkey only to people of ‘Turkish descent and culture’. The identifying features of 
“Turkishness” was not solely Turkish ethnicity but the ability and willingness to adopt the 
Turkish language and to be members of Muslim Sunni ethnic groups often closely associated 
with past Ottoman rule. Hence, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, Tatars etc… were very much 
included into this definition while Gagauz Turks, who are Christian, and members of other 
Christian minorities, Alevis and unassimilated Kurds where excluded. The immigration trends 
into Turkey very much support this.
47 The lifting of the geographical limitation would require 
a substantial overhaul of the law on settlement. Recently, the Turkish parliament adopted a 
completely new Settlement Law that, as will be discussed below, may change this situation.
48  
Inevitably the immigration issue is also closely associated with national identity.
49 The 
political reforms adopted in Turkey have led to a certain degree of a redefinition of the 
Turkish national identity. However, the process is far from complete and is closely linked to 
                                                 
44 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18.2.2003 published in Official Journal of the European Union, 
25.2.2003, L 50/1. 
45 Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Refugee Fund COM(1999) 686, 14.12.1999. 
Council Decision 2000/596/EC on 28
th September 2000 adopting a proposal establishing the European Refugee 
Fund. 
46 On EU’s externalization policy and the notion of using candidate countries and neighbors as a “buffer zone” 
see Sandra Lavanex and Emek Uçarer (eds.) Migration and the externalities of European Integration. (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002). See also Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards 
fortress Europe? (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2000). 
47 For details of this policy see Kemal Kirişci, “Disaggregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices” 
Middle Eastern Studies 36, No. 3, July 2000. 
48 The Turkish Grand National Assembly was due to debate a new draft law on settlement on 19 September 2006 
as part of the efforts to adopt the ninth package of EU reforms. The Law was published in the Official Gazette, 
No. 26301, (26 September 2006) as Law No. 5543. 
49 Kemal Kirişci, “National Identity, Asylum and Immigration: EU as a vehicle of "post-national" transformation 
in Turkey” in Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.) Turkey: Nationalism, Post-Nationalism and the European Community 
(I.B. Taurus, 2006).   17
the progress of Turkey’s EU membership. Hence, it is no wonder that Turkish officials 
dealing with asylum have not yet so far suggested any legislation that could open the way to 
granting full refugee status with the possibility of integration.  
 
These are challenges that aggravate the “Catch-22” situation that characterizes EU-Turkish 
relations. A typical manifestation of this situation arises in the use of pre-accession funds. 
Turkish authorities have prepared a project proposal for the construction of reception centers. 
However, in the meantime the European Commission had sent a clear signal that this would 
not be a good time to submit such a proposal on the grounds that the Commission could not 
release funds without actually seeing progress towards “rule adoption” in the area of asylum. 
This policy of flagging out a “sanction” is reinforcing the officials mistrust in the EU. The 
situation is paradoxically further aggravated because the Commission did support an earlier 
project to improve reception conditions but under the AENEAS program.
50 The granting to 
Turkey of EU financial and technical assistance that is typically offered to ‘third countries’ in 
the areas of migration and asylum fuels the mistrust of the Turkish side in respect to their 
status as a candidate state for membership. When this is combined with European 
Commission officials frustration with the little progress being made in the actual adoption of 
the EU acquis and development of the accompanying institutional, legislative and physical 
infrastructure mistrust becomes mutual creating a vicious spiral endangering the ability of 
“conditionality” to deliver “rule adoption” and eventual membership. 
 
Nevertheless, the impact of the transformation that has been going on in the area of asylum 
over the last decade is nudging Turkey towards a position that is closer to the one that the EU 
would like to see. In June 2006 the MOI Department, responsible for asylum matters, 
circulated an internal regulation
51 (Genelge) that according to a high ranking UNHCR official 
“pleasantly surprised them”.
52 The document basically sends instruction to the Police in 
general to speed and facilitate the implementation of tasks laid out in the Action Plan. In its 
introduction it recognizes that the regulation aims to meet the standards mentioned in the 
1951 Geneva Convention and the EU acquis. It introduces very specific measures that aim to 
improve access to the asylum system and ensure continuity for the trained personnel in their 
current position rather than risk to being moved to other irrelevant task as part of the standard 
rotation system. It lays out for the first time very specific rules concerning the process of 
identity determination of asylum seekers as well as clearly states that asylum seekers may 
well enter the country without identity and that this can not be held against them.
53 
Furthermore, this internal regulation also identifies the procedures to be followed to determine 
the outcome of an asylum application and appeal procedures for rejected cases. It also 
incorporates elements from current EU directives concerning country of origin information, 
provision of translation facilities and a positive interview environment. Lastly, it also 
underlines that refugees and asylum seekers who have a valid residence permit would be 
entitled to a work permit too and provides for the granting “secondary” or “subsidiary” 
protection short of full refugee status. 
 
                                                 
50 Regulation (EC) No. 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a programme for 
financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), of 
10.3.2004, OJ L80/1, 18.3.2004 
51 Uygulama Talimatı, Genelge No. 57, 22 June 2006.  
52 Interview with a high ranking UNHCR official. 
53 This is extremely fascinating because the principle that asylum seekers can no be denied access to asylum 
procedures on ground of false papers or no identity papers was a point that would come up regularly in the 
conext of discussion of the 1951 Geneva Convention.   18
Another development that is likely to have significant implication in terms of Turkey’s 
asylum policy is that in September 2006 a new Settlement Law to replace the one from 1934 
was adopted by the Turkish Parliament. This took place as part and parcel of the 
government’s effort to adopt what is referred to as the “Ninth Reform Package” to bring 
Turkey closer to meeting its promises to the EU. The new Settlement Law continues to limit 
immigration to Turkey to individuals and groups of “Turkish descent and culture”. However, 
unlike its predecessor it is silent on what happens to refugees. The previous Law in Article 4 
used language limiting full refugee status to individuals of “Turkish descent and culture” and 
called for the application of Nationality Law for other refugees. It is difficult to tell how this 
recent development will impact on Turkish asylum law and policy. This will also depend a lot 
on the kind of regulations that are adopted for the actual implementation of the new Law. 
Nevertheless it might still be possible that the new wording might well facilitate the eventual 
adoption of an Asylum Law that can indeed open the way for recognized refugees to stay on 
in Turkey rather than be resettled. Furthermore, this new Law may also facilitate the lifting of 
the geographical limitation.  
 
This may well bring Turkey much closer to providing the EU with evidence that progress is 
being made towards putting into place a fully fledged national status determination system. 
The UNHCR Representative in Ankara sees this development as unexpected and surprising 
but recognizes that it brings Turkey much closer to having its own status determination 
system. Is Turkey then giving in to what Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier call the “logic of 
consequence”?
54 Are Turkish decision makers typical rational actors “who seek to maximize 
their own power and welfare” and engage in bargaining about conditions and rewards? This 
may be difficult to substantiate for a number of reasons. The MOI Department has been 
working on a draft asylum law and also a regulation based on the EU directive dealing with 
“accelerated procedures” for asylum applications that seem manifestly unfounded. However, 
these drafts are far from taking their final form. Furthermore, so far not much progress had 
been made in respect to amending or replacing the Settlement Law and the target date of 2012 
as the date for imitating a legislative process for the lifting of the geographical limitation 
remains in tact. Also the mood of Turkish officials, in respect to “conditionality”, who deal 
with asylum and related issues that fall under the chapter heading “justice, freedom and 
security” was captured in a very telling manner by a high ranking Turkish diplomat at a 
meeting in September with UNHCR officials. He made references to the Negotiation 
Framework and noted that “if the EU aims to keep the negotiations open-ended so we shall 
also keep developments open-ended”. He added the importance that Turkey attributes to 
“reciprocity”. On that basis he noted that during the pre-accession period Turkey would adopt 
those rules and regulations that are deemed to benefit Turkey. Turkey on the other hand 
would keep an “open-ended” approach to the adoption of policies that do not offer mutual 
benefit. He gave the replacement of the liberal Turkish visa policy with the Schengen visa 
regime and the lifting of the geographical limitation as examples of two areas where Turkey 
would be reluctant to adopt EU acquis  as long as uncertainty over Turkish membership 
prevails.
55 Similar reactions can also be observed in other areas related to migration issues. 
For example the European Commission is also failing to induce much progress in the area of 
negotiating and concluding a readmission agreement with Turkey. There too progress is being 
limited by the very same concerns of the Turkish officials’ doubts about the EU’s 
                                                 
54 Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier, op cit, p. 9. 
55 Information obtained from the diplomat and third parties present at the meeting. For an analysis of the Turkish 
visa policy and the massive dilemmas that the adoption of the Schengen visa regime generates for Turkish 
officials see Kemal Kirişci, ‘A friendlier Schengen visa asylum system as a tool of “soft power”: the experience 
of Turkey’, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol.7, no.4, 2005.    19
commitment to Turkish membership. Actually, the very fact that no previous candidate 
country negotiated such an agreement with the EU and that such agreements have only been 
signed and are sought with third countries reinforces Turkish public officials doubts. It is not 
also surprising that the document adopted by the government in April 2007 laying down an 
harmonization schedule does not include these three issues. 
 
Conclusion: 
Considerable improvement has been achieved in respect to the Turkish asylum during the 
course of the last decade. The current system is much closer to the EU one than what 
prevailed in the mid-1990s. It is difficult to tell whether the Turkish asylum system has 
become “Europeanized”. However, it is possible to argue that the Turkish asylum system has 
indeed been transformed and is much more in tune with at least international standards if not 
the EU one too. The paper tried to demonstrate that it is difficult to explain this improvement 
on the basis of the “external incentive model” of Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier and the 
importance they attribute to conditionality. Turkish decision makers are well aware of the 
“sanctions and rewards” that the EU can yield in respect to “rule adoption”.
56 They are deeply 
conscious of the importance of the lifting of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. However, the fact that these policy makers like the rest of the country doubt the 
EU’s credibility in respect to granting full membership to Turkey if Turkey does indeed meet 
all the membership conditions, remain caught in a dilemma over whether to “lift” or “not to 
lift” the limitation. It seems that they will remain reluctant to lift it as long as the doubt 
remains. Hence this severely seems to limit the explanatory power of “conditionality” as an 
engine of “Europeanization”.  
Yet, how can one explain the transformation of Turkey’s asylum system so far. This may best 
be accounted for by the “social learning” and “lesson drawing” models that Schimmelfening 
and Sedelmeier briefly dwell upon. They note that the former model is driven by what they 
call “logic of appropriateness”. This is when actors act not out of coercion or bargaining 
concerns but when they believe that what needs to be done is legitimate and because they 
support the norms and values associated with the decision to be taken. The latter model on the 
other hand argues that “rule adoption” takes place because it is seen as a remedy to inherently 
domestic needs and policy challenges. The Turkish case seem to be best accounted for by 
these two models. A decade long socialization into the norms and standards advocated by the 
UNHCR and then subsequently various non-governmental organizations including the EU has 
transformed “hearts and minds” among officials. This has made them much more receptive to 
improvements. Furthermore these officials have also come to realize that improving the 
Turkish asylum system is also about, in an ironic manner, improving national sovereignty. In 
other words more than fifty years after having helped to draft the Geneva Convention and 
more than forty years after having ratified it Turkish officials are conscious that they are only 
beginning to reach the point where they will be able to fully implement and honor the 
Convention. These considerations seem to suggest that at least in the case of Turkey the 
“social learning” and “lesson drawing” models of Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier may offer 
a more parsimonious explaining for the transformation of Turkey’s asylum system and the 
Turkish officials dilemma “to lift or not to lift” the geographical limitation rather than the 
model that emphasizes the role of “conditionality” in “rule adoption”. 
 
                                                 
56 It is no wonder that the Turkish Grand National Assembly was in mid-September in extraordinary session in 
an effort to adopt a reform package in an effort to positively influence the Progress Report that the European 
Commission was due to conclude in October 2006.   20
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 
Table 1: Applications under the 1994 Asylum Regulation, 1995 - December 2006 
 
 
Country  Applications 
Accepted 
cases 
Rejected  
cases 
Pending  
cases 
Iraq 14,619  4,784 5,054 4,054
Iran 27,194  16,871 2,063 7,176
Afghanistan 938  284 275 370
Russia 77  15 38 18
Uzbekistan 187  69 70 38
Azerbaijan 36  3 24 1
Other Europe*  117  51 54 3
Other** 1,226  213 304 660
Total*** 44,394  22,290 7,882 12,320
 
* Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germeny, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine 
and Yugoslavia. 
** Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, 
Moritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen, Zaire.  
*** Not appearing in the table but included in the total are 1,710 applications that were subsequently withdrawn. 
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. 
Data current as of 07.12.2006 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Table 2: Resettlement out of Turkey by country of origin and country of settlement 
between 1995 and December 2006 
 
Country of 
Origin 
 
Country of Settlement 
   CanadaUSA Oceania
Other 
EuropeScandinaviaOthersTOTAL 
Afghanistan  71 89 3 17 79 -  259 
Iran  3,9106,895 2,414 221 3,295 11 16,746 
Iraq  865 630 1,036 664 1,478 33 4,706 
Africa  64 66 - 4 9 - 143 
North Afr.  3        -  - - 1 - 4 
Asia  55 26 1 - 7 - 89 
Middle East  16 - 5 7 6 1 35 
Bosnia-Her.   - 45  -  1 - - 46 
Others*  9 - - - - - 9 
TOTAL  4,9937,751 3,459 914 4,875 45 22,037 
 
Africa: Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan     
North Africa: Morocco, Libya, Tunisia          
Asia: Burma, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan       
Middle East: Palestine, Syria, Egypt   
Others*: Burundi, Kyrgyzstan, Jordan, Yemen. 
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand         
Other Europe: Austria, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands,  
Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine         
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
Others: Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates Source:  Data 
obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. 
Data current as of 07.12.2006 